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Abstract
Climate change has emerged as a major global issue that affects all nations and has become
a phenomena requiring global governance in the modern globalized world. Though the
African contribution to the increase Greenhouse Gas (GHG) is very small, climate change
is a concern of African countries. This paper is aimed to analyze the African position and
challenges in the governance of climate change. Nonetheless, there are opportunities
created for adaptation and mitigation, the implementation of these measures is constrained
by lack of financial, institutional and human capacities. Accordingly, the Africans position
in the international system and lack of the capacities required for meaningful engagement
leads to a challenge to participate effectively in global climate change negotiations. Despite
numerous internal difficulties facing the African countries in climate governance and
negotiations, this paper argues that African countries have shown an improvement in
response, and willingness to cooperate and participate compared to previous times.
Especially, in recent years, African states have managed to negotiate more effectively, both
individually and as a group.
Keywords: Africa Group of Negotiators, negotiations, climate governance, climate change.
Introduction
The issue of environment truly emerged onto the international political agenda at the 1972
UN-run Stockholm conference; however, it was only in the latter decades of the twentieth century
that environmental problems came to be recognized as more than local or even regional. Though
environment in general and climate change, in particular, is a global problem that requires global
solutions, its impacts require the active involvement of multiple national and local-level
stakeholders in shaping and implementing the solutions. Accordingly, global climate
governance, or the purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems towards
preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change (IPCC, 2014), has come
to be one of the central themes of debate and concern among different academic, political and
economic domains. Climate change governance takes into account principles of accountability,
management and institutional strengthening which are applied when tackling the various
challenges posted by climate change. It also includes a wide range of steering mechanisms ranging
from informal cooperation between different institutions and actors to hierarchical forms of
regulation. Therefore, climate change governance can be described as a wide variety of
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coordinating methods contributing to the adaptation and mitigation of climate change (Knieling,
& Filho, 2013).
Unlike the recent trend, climate change has had little relevance to development policymakers or practitioners, and has been viewed largely as an environmental concern, and
development approaches have been given less attention within the climate change community.
According to Makina (2013), climate change will interact at all scales with other trends in global
environmental and natural resource concerns, including water, soil and air pollution, health
hazards, disaster risk, and deforestation. Moreover, as Madzwamuse (2010) mentioned, due to its
predicted impacts on biodiversity, rural livelihoods and national and global economies, since the
early 1990s, climate change has emerged as a critical development issue. Similarly, climate change
is a concern of African countries; however, they might reach compliance but agree differently on
the global provisions towards addressing the global environmental problems. Studies have shown
that African contribution to the increase in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) is very small when compared
to that of other more developed continents; however, they are definnitely victims of the climate
change consequences. Recently, this has been verified at the Lima Climate Conference by the UN
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon (2014) who stated that “Climate change affects us all, but it does
not affect us all equally. The poorest and most vulnerable, those who have done the least to
contribute to global warming, are bearing the brunt of the impact today.” This paper is primarily
concerned with climate change governance and humbly tries to examine and analyze the position
of the African group in international climate politics by examining what the African group has
been saying regarding climate politics. The emerging literatures on the topic was used to develop
some preliminary hypotheses on the conditions under which all could expect to enhance the
African position on global climate politics. Accordingly, the paper found that in Africa, climate
change creates opportunities to support climate change response in adaptation and mitigation.
However, Africa has policy and funding challenges for both adaptation and mitigation. African
countries have become much more proactive during the UNFCCC negotiations since the early
2000s. A number of quantitative measures were utilized including submissions, delegation size,
and so on, and qualitative assessments by those within the AGN itself and beyond demonstrating
that participation has increased substantially.
In this paper, an introduction is followed by a section that briefly reviews the nexus
between climate change and development in Africa. The third section presents the empirical
assessment of the position and challenges of Africa in international climate change politics. This
section has two sub-sections. The first will focus on the African initiatives and their demands, the
role of different institutions contributing to the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN’s) work and
the African common position negotiation strategies. The second sub-section will focus on the 1)
African position in mitigation policy debate and responses; 2) African group's position before the
Lima climate conference; 3) African group's position at the Lima climate conference; and 4) the
challenges facing the African group during the negotiations. A final section concludes by
summarizing the main findings and pointing out future implications.
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Climate Change and Development in Africa
Here is an attempt to address the relationship between climate change and development in
the African perspective. Until recently, climate change has little relevance to development policymakers or practitioners. According to Madzwamuse, M. (2010), climate was viewed largely as an
environmental concern and development approaches have been given less attention within the
climate change community, which instead favors natural science approaches focusing on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. However, climate change has emerged as a critical development issue
since the early 1990s due to its predicted impacts on biodiversity, rural livelihoods and national
and global economies. In addition, it was found in the recent initiatives to strengthen links between
climate change and development communities, and experts can no longer ignore the fact that most
climate change impacts will fall predominantly on the world’s poorest people. Recently, this has
been verified at the Lima Climate Change Conference, 2014, by the UN Secretary General, Ban
Ki-moon.
There have been three conferences held on Climate Change and Development in Africa
(CCDA) and each conference presents an opportunity for stakeholders to deliberate on Africa’s
development in the context of climate change. These conferences have the theme of advancing
knowledge, policy and practice on climate change and development. The third conference was
held in 2013, and created forums for dialogue that raised awareness of the importance of climate
change, its impacts on development, and the nexus between science, policy and practice. The
findings of the conference showed the need to mainstream climate change through development
policy planning, programming and implementation. Accordingly, the conference did not pass
without mentioning the imperative which is clear and shows that climate change is a threat and an
opportunity (CCDA_III, 2013) .
Analyzing the Position and Challenges of the African Group
in the Global Climate Change Politics
This paper argues that African countries have shown an improvement in response, and
willingness to cooperate and participate in climate control compared to previous times. This
section will have three main parts: 1) The position of the African group in mitigation policy debate
and responses; 2) The position of the African group in global climate change negotiations; and 3)
The challenges facing the African group during the negotiations. Before engaging in looking at
these issues, it is necessary to review the regional initiatives and institutional contributions to the
African Group of Negotiators (AGNs) and some of the African demands related to climate change.
African Initiatives on Climate Change
For more than a decade, the world has been negotiating global agreements under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At the UNFCCC, a number of
actors, groups and platforms are instrumental in the development of a consolidated African
position. A Conference of the Parties, or COP, to negotiate climate change has been held annually
since 1995. Though AU adopted its own Declaration on Climate Change and Development in
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2007, the first time that it clearly expressed a common position was at the Copenhagen COP in
2009 when it put forward the ‘African Common Position on Climate Change’ that set the mandate
for African negotiators (AU/AMCEN, 2009). This position was built on the core concept of
‘environmental justice’ and stated that adaptation is the highest priority for Africa, since the
continent’s greenhouse gas emissions are so small. The AU has followed various strategies and
cooperated with a variety of actors on climate change issues, such as multiculturalism, bilateralism
and regionalism (Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen, & Wyk, 2014).
The Role of Different Institutions Contributing to the Africa Group of Negotiators
(AGN’s) Work
The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), initially formed in
1985, is a key platform involved in the process of presenting the African common position to the
UNFCCC. AMCEN has played a key role in terms of improving coordination of the common
African position. It has worked towards a common framework in which all climate change
programs in Africa are merged. For example, the African common position of 2009 was updated
at an AMCEN session and endorsed by the AU. AMCEN’s African Group of Experts, the technical
segment of AMCEN, has been instrumental in this respect. AMCEN provides technical input as
well as political oversight to the AGN. The Conference of African Heads of State and Government
on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) is the highest continental body for approving and endorsing the
common position. However, CAHOSCC is also fragmented, which has impeded smooth
functioning. Other key partners in supporting the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) are the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Climate Policy Centre
(ACPC) that have provided technical support to the AGN during the preparation for the UNFCCC
negotiations. In order to support its capacity, the AGN is supported by other technical agencies
such as the UN. Compared to the above-mentioned institutions which enable consultation and
coordination at the continental level to prepare for negotiations and develop the common position,
there are regional and sub-regional initiatives that have proven fragile in several instances of
negotiating positions. In turn, incoherence in their respective negotiating positions has generally
weakened the position of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations (Ramsamy et al., 2014) .
The African Common Position and Some of Their Demands
As Roger and Belliethathan (2016) discussed in their article, the African common position
on the African Environment and Development was announced at the Second Regional African
Ministerial Conference for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) held in Cote D’Ivoire in 1991. The 1991 conference, which marked the first occasion
in which all African states officially addressed the issue of climate change as a group, established
many principles that would become commonplace in African environmental diplomacy. For
example, it asserted the priority of economic development, improvement of quality of life and the
reduction in poverty over environmental considerations. It maintained that food and energy
security were vital concerns for African governments and affirmed their sovereignty over the use
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of natural resources. In order to achieve sustainable development, the common position called for
large financial transfers, transfers of technology and capacity building programs. According to
Hoste (2010), the process of the African position started in 2006. In addition, their common
position was initiated in 2008 in Algiers followed by the Nairobi Declaration in 2009 that resulted
in the common position. However, they made the key demands of the African Group based on the
Common Position of the Committee of the African Heads of State on Climate Change
(CAHOSCC) (Hoste, 2010). These include:
a) Financial compensation for natural, economic and social resources that have been lost and
the historical responsibility of developed countries on climate change in that respect (the
financial commitment of developed countries should be at least 1.5% of their global GDP).
b) The UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities should be respected.
c) Methodological demand: the African group wanted to keep the two track negotiations. This
meant they wanted to keep the distinction between the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention.
d) That developed countries needed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40%
below 1990 levels by 2020. By 2050 the GHG-emissions of developed countries should be
at least 80% to 95% below 1990 levels. In order to achieve the lowest level of stabilization
assessed by the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report. Furthermore, Hoste (2010) noted that
the African common position explicitly stipulated that they will not accept any delay by
developed countries to deeply cut their GHG emissions and asked for support for Africa to
adapt to the negative impacts of climate change.
The Position of the African Group in Mitigation Policy Debate and Responses
Under the African ministerial level conference, the climate change debate has primarily
focused on adaptation rather than mitigation as historically Africa’s contribution to global GHG
emissions has been small - approximately 1.75% of global energy, CO2 emissions from 19502000; and 3.85% of annual GHG emissions in 2000 (Winkler & Zipplies, 2009) (AMCEN, 2011).
Therefore, understandably the focus amongst practitioners, particularly in the context of the
UNFCCC climate negotiations, has been on attracting finance to build Africa’s adaptive capacity.
Whilst as a non-Annex 1 region, it is excluded from any quantified mitigation commitments under
the UNFCCC, and therefore, less emphasis is placed on mitigation. Since Africa needs to develop
economically to meet its priority of eradicating poverty, developing along a cleaner energy path,
and moving towards low carbon development, mitigation will be necessary in order to maintain
economic competitiveness in a global economy. The Africa Group has called on developing
countries to undertake several key actions relating to mitigation. These include:
1) A science-based aggregate target for developed countries to ensure to individually or
collectively reduce emissions in accordance with science, equity and historical
responsibility;
2) Individual commitments that are negotiated among all Parties to ensure developed
countries make adequate and equitable contributions to the Convention’s objective;
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3) Individual commitments that are binding in international law, not merely statements of
intention, or commitments that are binding merely in national law;
4) Effective reporting on achievement of commitments;
5) Review and continuing commitments by developed countries during second and
subsequent commitment periods; and
6) Mechanisms for compliance to ensure that developed countries fulfill their legally binding
commitments in practice.
On the whole, the African Group insists on the elaboration of a detailed and clear work
program for the Kyoto Protocol with the aim of adopting a final decision for the second
commitment period in Durban in 2011. On policy approaches on issues relating to Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), African country parties are willing
to undertake the following mitigation measures commensurate with their respective capabilities
and national circumstances: a) Reduce emissions from deforestation; b) Reduce emissions from
forest degradation; c) Conserve forest carbon stocks; and d) Sustain management of forests and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (AMCEN, 2011).
The Position of the African Group in the Global Climate Change Negotiations
Before engaging in examining the position of the African countries, it is necessary to
understand how the African countries participate in the international climate negotiations.
Therefore, according to Hoste (2010), one of the most important structural features of multilateral
negotiations is the emergence of coalitions. Moreover, the analysis of the capacity of developing
countries in multilateral negotiations would be incomplete without a section on the coalitions.
African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China (G77), LDCs and through the Africa
Group. South-South cooperation is particularly visible with the UNFCCC negotiations, with the
most important developing country coalition being the G77. In addition, African countries
participate in international negotiations through country groups and delegations that often
negotiate in their own capacity and within these coalitions. According to Roger (2013), Africa’s
climate negotiations are being strongly led by the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN). One
country is selected to chair the group for a period of two years and in January 2014, the Republic
of the Sudan became its chair. The AGN’s structure consists of all African Member States’ senior
officials, experts and negotiators in the UNFCCC negotiations with the African Ministerial
Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) providing political oversight to the group. It represents
the region in the international climate change negotiations with a common and unified voice. Since
the Earth Summit in 1992, African states have participated in coalitions such as the G77, Alliance
of Small Island States (AOSIS), and OPEC, and they have worked together as a regional group
through the African Group of Negotiators (AGN).
From the literature we can understand that scholars, including Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen
and Wyk (2014) as well as Roger (2013) and Dongo (2011) argued to the effective participation
of Africa as a group in the international climate change negotiations. As Dongo argued, in the
interest of a fair and equitable global response to climate change, Africa’s active and influential
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role in the climate change negotiations must be sustained. As African participation continues to
grow, strategies and resources need to be made available to create a space for many that will help
build a much stronger African voice. Therefore, the reasons for the effective participation as a
group in international climate change negotiations include (IISD, 2014):
1) Over the past five years, African negotiators have been able to considerably improve their
access to material resources, allowing them to increase the size and quality of their
delegations.
2) African negotiators have sought resources from a variety of international donors and
multilateral institutions. For example, at the request of the chair of the AGN, the African
Development Bank (AfDB) started to provide funding in 2008 for African delegates to
participate in the UNFCCC negotiations.
3) African states have improved their access to information and expertise.
4) African delegates have been able to negotiate with a much clearer mandate from African
leaders in recent years.
Furthermore, as other scholars such as Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen and Wyk (2014) argue,
Africa in recent years shows a consistent effort to formulate common positions ahead of key
moments in the global agenda. Creating the African Common Positions involves both technical
and political input from various African actors, organizations and platforms. African negotiators
often seek to form international partnerships to push their agenda forward. Accordingly, from the
discussions, we can understand that African’s internal challenges, especially before the last five
years, were the cause for its ineffective participation in global climate change politics. However,
recently it is easier to agree with those who argue that the African group is showing effective
participation in international climate negotiations.
African group’s position before the Lima climate conference.
Though the 1991 Cote d’Ivoire’s regional ministerial conference marked the first occasion
in which all African states officially addressed the issue of climate change as a group, until 2006,
African states had submitted more than 20 submissions and agenda items. Beginning around 2005,
however, as the effects of Africa’s lack of influence became particularly apparent, the AGN slowly
started to have a greater impact on the UNFCCC negotiations. From 2007 onwards, African
countries submitted less than 40 agenda items. Furthermore, in 2011 at COP17 in Durban, they
put forward about 100 submissions and agenda items, a number roughly equivalent to the total
submitted between 1991 and 2005. Indeed, after 2009, the number of AGN submissions even
dwarfed those of the G77/China, reversing a trend that had prevailed since the UNFCCC’s early
years when the G77/China dominated (Roger & Belliethathan, 2016). As Roger and Belliethathan
(2016) and Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen and Wyk (2014) recently discussed, African participation
in the UNFCCC has improved as demonstrated in the following conferences:
 At the 2006 COP12: COP12, which took place in Nairobi in 2006, proved to be a turning
point. As the first COP to take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, the meeting offered an ideal
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opportunity to call attention to the region’s concerns in front of a global audience. It also
helped to raise the issue’s salience among African leaders. As a result, more resources were
devoted to the talks, and African negotiators made significant efforts to develop a common
position that would adequately reflect Africa’s urgent needs. The meeting enabled Africa’s
negotiators to reach a consensus on several issues, not only on adaptation and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), but also deforestation, climate finance and technology
transfer. As a result of the AGN’s efforts, the conference achieved two important outcomes
meant to address some of the major issues it had identified. The first was the Nairobi Work
Program on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change which sought to
improve capacity building related to adaptation decision-making in LDCs. The second was
the Nairobi Framework - aimed to facilitate participation of under-represented countries in
the CDM (Reger & Belliethathan, 2016).
Similarly, Ramsamy; Knoll; Knaepen and Wyk (2014) scrutinized the positions of the
African group before the Lima climate conference:
 In the run-up to COP 15: In subsequent negotiations, African efforts to influence the
negotiations grew substantially, especially during and after COP15 in Copenhagen. During
this conference African country showed more willingness to act jointly, and they argued
that Africa was one of the most united groups at COP 15 articulating its position very well
as a result of polishing the common position. The proposal of a “common responsibility
framework for mitigation” put forth by developed countries was perceived by Africa as
blurring the distinction between the commitments of developed countries and those of
developing countries, as laid down in the earlier mentioned CBDR-principle. Sudan, for
the Group of 77, and China, G-77/China, called upon parties to observe the principles of
good faith, transparency, inclusiveness and openness. Africans are already impacted by
climate change through increased droughts, health hazards, food scarcity and migration.
The African representative called for transparent and equitable negotiations during the
high-level segment.
 At the 2010 COP 16, held in Cancun: African political leaders showed significant
differences, especially among regional powers, whereas technical negotiators appeared
united. It was nearly impossible to consolidate the political and technical positions.
 At the 2011 COP 17, in Durban: An African flagship partnership was created. This was the
first time Africa had a dedicated platform at the conference for high-level engagement.
This partnership was the result of preparation for the COP and support from continental
institutions including the African Development Bank. At this conference, African countries
put forward about 100 submissions and agenda items.
 During the COP19, held in Warsaw in 2013: Africa presented a common position. The
African Group of Negotiators (AGN) pointed out that historical responsibility in
greenhouse gas emissions as well as loss and damage should be addressed. As a result, a
Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage was established. This addresses loss and damage
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associated with the impacts of climate change, including extreme events in the most
vulnerable developing countries.
African group's position at the Lima climate conference.
Though the current chair of the African group is from the Republic of the Sudan, during
the Lima climate conference, it was observed that countries like Swaziland, Kenya, Ghana and
Ethiopia spoke on behalf of the African group. In this section, the paper scrutinizes the position of
the African group with some other countries’ positions for the sake of comparison. At the COP20,
held in 2014 in Lima, substantive negotiations took place on the seven elements of: finance;
adaptation; mitigation; cooperation and support; transparency of action and support; technology;
and capacity building (IISD, 2014):
 Finance: on differentiation, Sudan, for the African Group, with Ecuador and Bolivia, for
G-77/China opposed text suggesting “all” parties mobilize climate finance through a
diversity of actions. The African Group recalled differentiation between developed and
developing countries under the Convention, and the responsibility of developed countries
to provide finance. Mexico clarified that “results-based” is not a precondition for access to
finance, and stressed prioritizing both mitigation and adaptation finance. The EU clarified
that “evolving responsibilities and capabilities” captures the growth in the levels of
prosperity and GHG emissions of developing countries, noting that some are currently
more prosperous than some EU member states. However, on Thursday, 4 December,
Sudan, for the African Group, supported by Bolivia, for the G-77/China, Saudi Arabia,
Maldives, India, South Africa, Ecuador, Zambia, Pakistan, Argentina and others introduced
a conference room paper (CRP) containing draft elements of climate finance under the
ADP, requesting that it replace the Co-Chairs’ non-paper as the basis for discussion.
 Adaptation: On loss and damage, the African Group and others, opposed by Australia,
emphasized that it should become a stand-alone element in the new agreement. New
Zealand opposed any reinterpretation of Decision 2/CP.19 (Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage).
 Mitigation: On differentiation, Kenya, for the African Group, lamented the overall lack of
reference to equity, CBDR, mitigation obligations of developed countries, and specific
national and regional development priorities. The EU said the text should reflect that all
parties will eventually take quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets. The US
called for an option in the text to update the Convention’s annexes to reflect parties
changing economic and emissions trends.
 Cooperation and Support: Many parties supported consolidating the section on cooperation
and support with sections on other elements.
 Transparency of Action and Support: South Africa, supported by Mexico, proposed
launching a process for discussing transparency rules during 2015, with South Africa says
this should be reflected in the ADP conclusions from Lima. The African Group, South
Africa, Chile, Panama, Nauru, Brazil and Mexico called for building on the existing
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measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework, with some suggesting it could
evolve over time. The African Group cautioned against placing additional burdens on
developing countries. Argentina, the LDCs, the African Group, Saudi Arabia and China
emphasized differentiation, with many calling for maintaining the existing “two-track”
approach to MRV.
Technology: Swaziland, for the African Group, said that commitments should not shift
responsibility from developed to developing countries, nor encourage private over public
support. On institutional arrangements, Swaziland, for the African Group, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, Algeria and Argentina preferred anchoring institutional arrangements in the
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(CTCN).
Capacity Building: Regarding institutional arrangements, South Africa, China, India, Iran,
Tanzania, Tuvalu for the LDCs, and others were opposed by Canada, Japan, the EU, the
US and others in regard to supporting the establishment of an international capacitybuilding mechanism. India noted that mobilization of private capital cannot be one of its
essential elements. Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group, the EU, Belize,
Chile for AILAC, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Belarus, the Russian Federation, and
Turkey endorsed the Co-Chairs’ text. Sudan for the African Group, Malaysia for the
LMDCs, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, India, Uganda, Paraguay, Pakistan and others were
opposed to the text. The African Group stressed the importance of the principles of the
Convention; the concept of differentiation, cautioning against undermining it implicitly or
explicitly, adaptation as Africa’s priorities, and equal and balanced treatment of these
elements alongside mitigation and transparency. Noting that the gap is gradually closing,
Nigeria asked parties to address issues raised by the African Group. Calling the text
unacceptable in its current form, the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified areas
not addressed, including: parity among the elements, differentiation, scope of INDCs
beyond mitigation, and work stream 2 (pre-2020 ambition).

The Challenges Facing the African Group During the Negotiations
Historically, as Roger (2013) discussed, delegations from Africa have faced challenges
related to participating effectively in global climate change negotiations as a result of their position
in the international system and a lack of the capacities required for meaningful engagement. In
recent years, African states have nevertheless managed to negotiate more effectively, both
individually and as a group. Critical to this has been efforts to gain access to material resources
and better information, as well as clearer mandates from African leaders. On the other hand, other
scholars Ramsamy et al (2014) argue that some of the main causes of fragmentation within the
group are policy positions on climate change, which vary according to environmental and political
priorities as well as the ways states are classified. For example, within the Group there is the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that places emphasis on response
measures. There is also the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) that are pushing for all large
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GHG emitters to take more responsibility in reaching the 2 degree limit in temperature, while the
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have a particular interest in finance, technology transfer and
adaptation. Within this mix, South Africa stands out, not only as one of the continent’s largest
economies, but as a significant contributor to GHG emissions.
Moreover, the challenge facing South Africa is that it is part of the AGN, but at the same
time, it is also aligned with other geopolitical groupings including the BASIC that includes Brazil,
South Africa, India and China. The BASIC group was established in 2009, initially to promote the
Copenhagen Accord and to promote the interests of the G77 with regards to GHG emission
reduction commitments. These all pose a challenge that Africa as a continent is still working
through. Similarly, Mekina (2013) mentioned the challenges of African countries during the
negotiation in international climate change politics. The following could be a typical example:
 Delegation Size: Many African country delegations are comprised of fewer people than
those of more developed countries.
 Delegation Composition: African delegations habitually negotiate in isolation without
sufficient support from their countries. Richer delegations may be accompanied by policy
makers and scientists who can decipher the complex technical language, its implications to
national priorities, and provide supporting evidence.
 Lack of Negotiating Experience: Many country negotiators are not familiarity with how
negotiations are done.
 Science versus Diplomacy: Many country negotiators lack research to support their
positions.
 Other Technical Issues: There are technical challenges specific to some African country
delegations. These include slow or lack of Internet, which limits access to networks that
can serve as information resources and powerful contacts.
 Politics of the Africa Group: As with all diverse negotiating coalitions, the Africa Group
is not immune to politics.
Conclusion
This paper attempted to examine the position and challenges of the African countries in
international climate change politics. Though studies have shown that African contribution to the
increase in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) is very small, they are definitely victims of the climate change
consequences. Climate change has emerged as a critical development issue since the early 1990s
due to its predicted impacts on biodiversity, rural livelihoods and national and global economies.
Accordingly, climate change is a concern of African countries; however, they might comply and
agree differently on the global provisions towards addressing the global environmental problems.
Therefore, the paper has analyzed the position and challenges facing the African countries for the
governance of climate change, addressed this issue in the third section of the paper that is organized
as: 1) the African position in mitigation policy debate and responses; 2) the African group's
position before the Lima climate conference; 3) the African group's position at the Lima climate
conference; and 4) the challenges facing the African group during the negotiations.

International Journal of African Development v.4 n.1 Fall 2016

15

The paper argues that both adaptation and mitigation have opportunities and challenges.
To utilize the opportunities effectively and to reduce the negative effects of climate change,
strengthening the institutional capacities will be the first thing to be considered in our mind. For
this, there have been institutions that have initiatives, plans and strategies to respond to the
challenges arising from climate change. However, the implementation of these measures is
constrained by inadequate financial, institutional and human capacities. Africa needs to have an
effective voice at international climate conferences and influence on the global agreement that will
emerge to ensure that development and poverty reduction agendas are included in the outcome and
follow-up action at national, regional and global levels.
As was discussed, the UNFCC instruments for capacity building, finance and technology
transfer have presented the main opportunities for the participation of African countries. As a
result, African countries have become much more proactive in UNFCCC negotiations. A number
of quantitative measures, including submissions, delegation size, and qualitative assessments by
those within the AGN itself and beyond, demonstrate that participation has increased substantially.
Conferences of the Parties, or COPs, to negotiate climate change have been held annually since
1995. The AU adopted its own declaration on Climate Change and Development in 2007, and it
clearly expressed a common position at the Copenhagen COP in 2009 when it put forward the
African Common Position on Climate Change that set the mandate of African negotiators.
One of the most important structural features of multilateral negotiations is the emergence
of coalitions. Accordingly, African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China (G77),
LDCs and the Africa Group. Africa’s climate negotiations are currently being strongly led by the
Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN), an alliance that consists of climate change negotiators from
every African country. The paper scrutinizes the African group’s position in the previous
conferences as well as in the Lima climate conference. Before the Lima conference, in terms of
polishing the common position, Africa was one of the most united groups at COP 15, articulating
its position very well. Moreover, at the Durban Conference an African flagship partnership was
created. This was the first time Africa had a dedicated platform for high-level engagement at the
conference.
At the COP 20, held in 2014 in Lima, substantive negotiations took place on seven
elements: finance; adaptation; mitigation; cooperation and support; transparency of action and
support; technology; and capacity building. At this conference, African countries, including Sudan,
Kenya, Swaziland, and South Africa for the African Group, passionately expressed the overall lack
of reference to equity, CBDR, mitigation obligations of developed countries, and specific national
and regional development priorities. The African Group also said that commitments should not
shift responsibility from developed to developing countries, nor encourage private over public
support. Similarly, they stressed the importance of the principles of the convention, the concept of
differentiation, the cautioning against undermining implicitly or explicitly, the adaptation as
Africa’s priority, and equal and balanced treatment of these elements alongside mitigation and
transparency. Historically, the Africans position in the international system and lack of capacities
required for meaningful engagement led to a challenge to participate effectively in global climate

16

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

change negotiations. However, in recent years, African states have managed to negotiate more
effectively, both individually and as a group. The reasons for the effective participation as a group
in international climate change negotiations include improving their access to material resources,
and improving their access to information and expertise that enable them to negotiate with a much
clearer mandate. Apart from the UNFCC finance provisions of the AGNs, the African
Development Bank has also contributed a significant role in the AGNs work. The principle of
equity, which the African groups framed, has led them to participate effectively in global climate
change negotiations.
However, the paper also identified some of the problems facing the group. Fragmentation
within the African Group has been one of the challenges, and the main causes are policy positions
on climate change, which vary according to environmental and political priorities as well as the
ways states are classified. Besides, the challenge facing South Africa in negotiation is that it is part
of the AGN, but at the same time, it is aligned with other geopolitical groupings including the
BASIC countries of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. Other challenges facing African
countries during negotiations include delegation size, delegation composition, lack of familiarity
of how negotiations are done, lack of research based on science and diplomacy, and lack of
immunity from politics.
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